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Abstract. This article is based on a monographic field study, which was conducted 
in October 2007. In addition, the results of other studies on the headscarf issue 
conducted at different times between 2003 and 2007 have also been used to follow 
the development over the course of time. The study found that the headscarf 
prohibition has no strong social basis. As it would be a mistake to see the headscarf 
prohibition as an element of the secularism project, defining an ideology on the basis 
of the headscarf, an important religious symbol in Turkey, presents a risk to the 
progress of democracy, and only serves to increase political polarization.   
Formulating public policies on the basis of the headscarf prohibition will only help 
destroy social peace. Social engineering projects which aim to change or destroy 
political, religious and ethnic positions of citizens are not permitted in Western-type 
contemporary democracies. There is no headscarf problem in Turkey in a 
sociological sense, the real problem lies in the totalitarian/authoritarian approach 
which stems from groundless fears and/or ideological choices of the social elite or 
economic power centers.  
 
JEL Classification Codes: D71, D79. 




Historically and from a religious point of view, the hijab or headscarf is not a 
phenomenon first faced by mankind with the emergence of Islam.  The 
headscarf has been part of pagan cultures as well as monotheistic religions 
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(Çığ, 2005; Çığ, 1995).  In monotheistic religions, the headscarf has 
primarily been the trademark of free and virtuous women whereas female 
slaves did not cover their head and wore low-cut dresses.  For centuries the 
headscarf has carried a religious, sexual, social and political meaning 
regardless of whether it has been used as a means of erotism, insult, 
romantism, piety or purity (Shirazi, 2001). Naturally, women wearing the 
headscarf have carried the meanings symbolized by the headscarf.  In our 
age, it is interesting that, when compared to Western societies, in Islamic 
countries important political debates are primarily carried out by men about 
women as women are considered hierarchically in the secondary position 
(Arat, 2000). Although the hijab or turban has also been used by men 
throughout history, men as dominant actors of the public sphere were 
exposed to a greater level of social evolution.  In different societies, while 
men in the public sphere were exposed to evolution, women who were 
excluded from the public sphere continued to be “historical” and resisted 
evolution. 
Although the headscarf has undergone a great deal of change in 
Muslim societies up until now, it is, in fact, a phenomenon which has 
strongly resisted its removal and has protected its existence strongly (Erdem, 
2007a).
1 Moreover, the use of the headscarf in public life has become even 
more common in the countries such as Turkey (Erdem, 2007a: 10; Göle, 
2000).
2 The headscarf has caused intensive debates not only in Muslim 
countries, but also in Western non-Muslim countries over the last 30 years 
(Maussen, 2007); it has been dealt with in such different contexts as public 
sphere-private sphere, religious context-human rights, secularism, the 
religion-state relationship and politics (McGoldrick, 2006).
3  
                                                            
1 According to the research of Tarhan Erdem, conducted in 2003 and published in 
the daily Milliyet between 27 and 31 May 2003, there is at least one woman wearing 
headscarf in 77.2% of families; 64.2% of women aged 18 and above cover their 
heads in social life and the number of women wearing headscarf increases 
considerably in older age. 
2 Nilüfer Göle claims that discussions regarding the relationship between the public 
sphere and Islam are conducted around the issue of women’s place in society. 
3 Debates on the headscarf or hijab cover a wide variety of aspects: religious 
obligation, oppression of women, religious extremism, political symbolism, 
evidence of the failed integration of immigrants, the relationship with terrorism, 
human rights perspectives, freedom of religion, political rights and civil freedoms, 
gender discrimination, minority rights and cultural rights, and secularism and 
neutrality are the most prominent debates. 
 The Headscarf Controversy in Turkey  45
The emergence of headscarf as a problem in public life (Mandell, 
1989; Smith, 2007) is, in fact, related to the evolution of public sphere.  With 
the development of civil society and democracy, a differentiated public 
sphere emerged.  While this phenomenon and discussions around it were 
witnessed in Western countries at earlier times (Roy, 2007),
4 it began to be 
seen in the Muslim countries after 1980 in parallel with democratic 
evolution.  The headscarf issue is a phenomenon that emerged during this 
socio-political evolutionary process (Çaha, 2005).  
The level of academic and political attention which the headscarf has 
attracted in Western countries in the recent years is striking (Shadid and van 
Koningsveld, 2005). Headscarves of women and loose robes and beards of 
men have began to carry political meanings due to the rise of Islamophobia 
after the 9/11 attacks, and Western people have begun to see these symbols 
as the signs of political Islam, fundamentalism or even terrorism (Yaqoob, 
2008). This excessive reaction by Western people has also been witnessed in 
Muslim countries to a lesser degree and with a different tone.  For example, 
courts in Turkey have punished women in headscarves on the grounds that 
they violate the right to education of people who do not wear headscarf 
(Yavuz, 2000).  An interesting point in this context is that the attitudes of 
state authorities in Turkey and France toward the headscarf have great 
similarities as compared to the attitude of other Western countries (Hancock, 
2008; Scott, 2007).
5  
The history of the the hijab or headscarf issue in Turkey dates back 
to the establishment of the Republic.  In prior to this, in the Ottoman era, 
revolutions in clothing were solely concerned with men.  The Ottoman state 
used separate law systems for civil society and state affairs because of its 
intensive relations with Western societies. For example, it used the 
Gregorian calendar in state affairs whereas it kept the Muslim calendar for 
civil society. While secular law was in force for state affairs, Sharia law was 
implemented in the affairs of the civil Muslim society. Christians and Jews 
were allowed to implement their religious law.  During the Ottoman Empire, 
the costume revolution was initiated by the Sultans themselves and the fez, 
trousers and other Western-type clothes were made compulsory for civil 
                                                            
4 Oliver Roy thinks that expecting a consensus among groups or individuals with 
regard to complying to rules is natural, but expecting the same consensus on values 
is wrong. 
5 Students wearing headscarves who attended public schools in France faced legal 
proceedings in 1989, 1994 and 2003.  This issue was presented to the French public 
as a problem of Islam. 
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servants. Actually, Sultan Mahmut II was named the ‘infidel sultan’ by 
people because of the dress code reforms he initiated.  In the light of this 
history, the concept of dress reform had a long association with revolution, a 
fact not forgotten by the rulers of the new Turkish republic.   
Since women did not have serious place in the civil life, no dress 
reform was imposed on women by the state.  During the initial period of the 
Turkish Republic, in which intensive reforms were initiated, the symbol of 
the costume revolution was the hat.  Although Atatürk wanted Turkish 
women to dress as European women, he did not initiate any reforms on their 
dress habits (Kandiyoti, 1991). Atatürk prohibited the fez and made hat 
wearing compulsory.  In fact, the fez was considered unacceptable from a 
religious point of view when it first began to be used.  Modernization of 
society through symbolic costume reform was attempted during the Ottoman 
and republican periods (Breu and Marchese, 2000). In the first years of the 
republic, today’s turban or headscarf was not used by Turkish women.  In 
those days, local costumes such as the charshaph (a garment covering a 
woman from head to foot), ihram (a seamless white woolen garment) and 
shawl were commonly worn.  The turban emerged in those years as the 
modernized form of the covering adopted by Christian people.  
In Turkey, the first incident involving the turban or headscarf was 
seen during the 1968 student riots when a student wearing a headscarf 
attended classes in the Divinity Faculty of Ankara University.  However, at 
that time, there was no broadly implemented prohibition in place.
6 The use 
of the headscarf in universities or highschools giving religious education did 
not become a problem until the 1980 military coup.  Only when the military 
rulers chose to regulate university education in the 1982 constitution, the 
headscarf began to become a problem (Weil, 2004; Judge, 2004; Joppke, 
2007; Gallala, 2006).
7  
                                                            
6 The founder of modern Turkey, M. Kemal Atatürk, enacted the dress code in 1934 
and he did not include women in it.  The wife of Atatürk, Latife, wore the traditional 
dress (charshaph) covering her whole body.  In fact, Latife Hanim was given as an 
example in the process of legitimizing the headscarf by President Abdullah Gül’s 
wife. An ironic comparison is made by referring to the Virgin Mary and it is claimed 
that the headscarf is also a legitimate phenomenon in Christianity by putting forward 
the question “Would you ask Mother Mary to remove her Headscarf?” 
7 The headscarf is prohibited even in Western countries in parallel with discussions 
on secularism.  In fact, the French Parliament enacted a law prohibiting the 
headscarf in the schools.   Joppke and Gallala compare the legal position towards the 
headscarf issue in France and Germany in the context of neutrality of state. 
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However, the 1980s discussion on the headscarf differed from 
today’s discussion.  By getting the support of a working group in which the 
State Minister, Prof. Ekrem Pakdemirli, the chancellor of Istanbul 
University, Prof. Cem’i Demiroğlu, the head of the Council of Higher 
Education, Prof. İhsan Doğramacı, and Prime Minister Turgut Özal 
persuaded President Kenan Evren that the headscarf should be used in 
universities in a uniform and orderly manner rather than the use of the 
headscarf in different shapes, forms and colors. The group also succeeded in 
getting the approval of the army generals by persuading them that it was a 
part of fashion in countries such as Italy as proved by the pictures in fashion 
magazines.  President Evren agreed with Doğramacı that the turban of the 
wife of State Minister Mehmet Keçeciler would cause no harm in 
universities. Doğramacı stated that they gave university lecturers and 
authorities who were against headscarf on secular grounds notes they had 
received from shops saying that ‘they are turbans’ (Doğramacı, 2008).  In 
fact, in public speeches in different parts of the country, Kenan Evren said 
that the use of different styles and colours of headscarves in universities was 
not good for eyes.  He further stressed that the turban, which was worn in a 
uniform style, was more modern and simple and only the turban could be 
used by university students to cover their heads. 
Nevertheless, some universities prohibited the headscarf.  The 
prohibition was implemented differently in different universities rather than 
it was implemented in a uniform manner throughout the country.  When the 
coalition government faced military intervention with the decision of the 
National Security Council on 28 February 1997, Turkey entered a new phase 
of fundamentalist secularism, having radical effects on the headscarf issue in 
universities.  The prohibition of the headscarf was implemented strictly in 
universities and even in highschools providing religious education and 
consequently tens of thousands of female students left schools and some 
went to foreign countries to continue their education (Kentel, 2007; Arat, 
1998).
8  Among those who chose to receive foreign education were there the 
daughters of the current prime minister, ministers, parliamentarians, 
prominent businesspersons and bureaucrats.  In fact, the interaction between 
                                                            
8 Actually fundamentalist secularists state that they are not against the use of the 
headscarf by traditional uneducated housewives, but they oppose its use by educated 
politically active women who are employed in public jobs. This gives important 
clues about the modernism project.  Kentel analyzes this attitude in the context of 
authoritarian secularism.  Arat’s work represents a detailed study on the political, 
economic and social adventures of women during the Republican period. 
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these conservative circles and the West is an interesting topic, which should 
be studied separately. 
The February 28 process, which aimed at engineering social life 
once again, was interrupted at the end of 2002 by the election victory of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) which had a conservative, religious 
identity.  During the AKP rule, the initiators of the February 28 process and 
their supporters fell into real distress.  The local elections in 2004 and the 
general elections in 2007 witnessed a radical increase in the power of the 
AKP.  The military’s intervention in politics in April 2007 to prevent the 
election as president of a person whose wife wore the headscarf deepened 
the division in society and resulted in a record increase in the votes of the 
AKP in the July 2007 elections (Falk, 2007: 51-55).
9 After the elections, 
Abdullah Gül, whose wife wears the headscarf, was elected as president and 
a law allowing wearing headscarves in universities was passed by the 
parliament.  The law was supported by rightist parties and opposed by ethnic 
Kurdist, leftist and fundamentalist secularist parties. Eventually, the 
Constitutional Court annulled the law on the ground that it violated the 
principle of secularism in the constitution and the Principal State Counsel at 
the Court of Cassation brought a case on 16 March 2008 to the 
Constitutional Court demanding the dissolution of the AKP since it played 
role in the enactment of the headscarf law.  The case was concluded on 30 
July 2008 with the judgment that the AKP had been at the centre of activities 
violating secularism.  However, the party was not dissolved; it was only 
deprived of half of the grant provided by the Treasury.   
Thus, the headscarf issue had become such a serious problem that it 
nearly caused the dissolution of the democratically elected governing party.  
In this context, contrary to the claims of people who oppose the headscarf, 
the issue is not only an ideological problem, but it is a problem with a 
considerably strong social base.  A problem not having a social basis would 
not be so explosive and long-lasting (Çaha, 2007).  
In Turkey, there are numerous theoretical and empirical studies 
conducted on the turban or headscarf.  There is a common and strong belief 
that Turkish people do not see anything wrong with the use of headscarf by 
women because they do not consider the headscarf as something contrary to 
secularism or as constituting a threat to the secular state structure (Hazar 
Eğitim Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, 2007; A&G Research,   2008b; 
                                                            
9 The victory of the AKP is occasionally depicted by the Western media as a victory 
by Islamists against secularism. 
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Oğuzhan, 1998).
10  There is even strong support for allowing the use of the 
headscarf by people working in state departments.  In this context, it could 
be said that headscarf is a problem created artificially by the state elite rather 
than being a problem that emerged in the social sphere.  In fact, the main 
opposition party in Turkey has reached the point where it defines its identity 
on the basis of being opponent of the headscarf.
11  
The present study is based on a monographic field research 
conducted in the third quarter of 2007. However, the results of some other 
studies conducted on the headscarf between 2003 and 2007 have been used 
to provide a picture of the change over time. 
 
b. Research Methodology 
Respondents: This study is based on fieldwork conducted in October 2007 
(Table 1). Face-to-face interviews were carried out in 12 cities, which 
constitute a NUTS-1 regional system developed by the Turkish Statistical 
Institute to represent the whole of Turkey. Sex, marital status, age and the 
provinces of the sampling are listed in Table 1. We excluded the institutional 
population and sampled only adults over 18. The number of registered voters 
as of the July 27, 2007 general election was 42,799,303. Our sample size 
was 2903, with a confidence level of 99%, and confidence interval of 
.02391.  
Sampling Design: While constructing the sample, we applied multi-staging, 
stratifying and clustering techniques. After determining provinces 
(stratified), districts and blocks (clustered, proportional to population), we 
also applied gender and age quotas. Once the blocks were fixed, then we 
selected the first dwelling units randomly and then followed systematic 
numbers.  
Questionnaire Design: The questionnaire was structured and composed of 
both open-ended and close-ended questions. Almost all of our questions 
have been tested and implemented several times in various surveys in the 
past so reliability and validity of the questionnaire’s items were assured. 
                                                            
10 Oğuzhan demonstrates that the social lives of tens of thousands of women have 
changed radically because of the prohibition of the headscarf. 
11 The CHP applied to the Constitutional Court on 27 February 2008 for the 
annulment of the law allowing the headscarf in universities. 
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Procedure: We used a cross-sectional survey method to gather data. A well-
known and well-respected pollster (Pollmark Research) implemented and 
coded the survey. We, as researchers, accompanied Pollmark staff during 
every step of the fieldwork. A face-to-face interview technique was used to 
fill out questionnaires. Pollmark field inspectors fastidiously audited the 
interviewers. Experienced interviewers were used and retrained for the 
questionnaire. Besides telephone checking in the survey field, after 
collecting all questionnaires at the coding center, we carried out telephone 
checking to randomly selected interviewees as a second quality control. Data 
processing and debugging were the ordinary procedures.  
Data analysis: Initially, we carried out a non-parametric test (chi square) for 
variables, which would be used later in more complex analyses. Then we 
conducted multi-dimensional scaling and factor analysis for data reduction. 
Thirdly, we analyzed the findings (new variables) obtained from factor 
analysis and implemented an ANOVA test to determine significance level.  
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Table 1.Demographic Characteristics 
Sex Frequency Percent 
     Female  1383 47.7
     Male  1520 52.3
Marital Status  
     Married  1876 64.6
     Single  900 31.0
     Widow/Divorced  127 4.4
Age Structure 
     18-25  769 26.5
     26-35  715 24.6
     36-45  585 20.2
     46-60  567 19.5
     61 and over  266 9.2
Provinces (NUTS 1)* 
     Adana (7 districts)   355 12.2
     Ankara (11 districts)  340 11.7
     Bursa (5 districts)  284 9.8
     Erzurum (3 districts)  110 3.8
     Gaziantep (5 
districts)  186 6.4
     Istanbul (18 
districts)  516 17.8
     İzmir (11 districts)  401 13.8
     Kayseri (4 districts)  170 5.8
     Malatya (3 districts)  97 3.3
     Samsun (4 districts)  184 6.3
     Tekirdağ (4 
districts)  130 4.5
     Trabzon (3 districts)  129 4.4
*NUTS-1 - The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. 
 
2. Secularist Perception of Headscarf and the Nature of Demands of 
Women Wearing Headscarf 
In Turkey, the secular elite as well as women organizations including 
feminists do not have any sympathy toward women wearing the headscarf 
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and do not promote their welfare or do not support them in getting an 
education, participating in public life and benefiting from public goods 
(Seçkinelgin, 2006: 764; Marshall, “2005: 109). These groups have no plans 
to integrate the large headscarf-wearing part of society into community life 
and state structures and ideology. On the contrary, they act with hatred and 
enmity to the extent that they do not want to see women in headscarves in 
any part of community life, virtually leaving them to the mercy of their 
husbands and the Islamists. Demands for recognition and public 
participation coming from women in headscarves are delegitimized and 
rejected with the use of state feminism and state secularism (Arat, 2007: 17-
23). In the eyes of secularists and feminists, the headscarf is the symbol of 
backwardness rather than of women conscious of their rights and freedoms 
and demands on this issue carry the threat of radical Islam and a theocratic 
state. 
In secular and feminist minds, a society governed according to 
Islamic codes of conduct adopted and defended by Islamists cannot escape 
from becoming a backward society because the Islamist ideology envisages 
an unequal division of labor between men and women. Men fulfill duties in 
the public place while women are isolated from outside and are mainly 
responsible for bringing up children and doing daily housework. The 
headscarf serves as a symbol of this division of labor and the banning 
women from public life (Genel and Karaosmanoğlu, 2006; Göle, 1991).
12 
According to this view, women do not cover their heads out of personal 
choice, but they are forced to do so by Islamist men. Islamist men do not 
want to see Islamist women publicly active and try to promote the view that 
all women should cover their head by insisting on the headscarf issue and 
encouraging Islamist women to defend the right of head covering. Their real 
purpose is the establishment of an Islamic regime in which all women have 
to wear the headscarf and are excluded from the public (Marshall, 2005: 
109-110). According to this way of thinking, women defending the right to 
wear the Muslim headscarf are not seeking citizenship rights, but are 
initiating a revolt against the system. Therefore, they should be denied this 
right and should be excluded from the distribution of public goods. This is in 
fact a species of gender-based discrimination since Islamist men are not 
controlled and excluded from the public for their Islamic views and actions 
(Seçkinelgin, 2006: 763-764). Women are denied any role in the public 
                                                            
12 However, woman with headscarf is the indispensable element of the emergence of 
a new educated-conservative urban class. Göle takes woman as a focal point to 
explain the evolution of Islamic social experience. 
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sphere unless they adopt the secular codes of the state ideology and give up 
covering their heads. This view amounts to ignoring the dynamic nature of 
Islamist women’s demands for receiving education and joining the 
workforce to improve and realize their personality. This also strengthens the 
patriarchal structure in the community, deserts women who are indeed 
wearing the headscarf because of family pressures, and deprives the 
community of the contribution of women wearing the headscarf for personal 
reasons including religious ones. 
The simple desire of women wearing the headscarf is to enjoy the 
freedom of covering their heads and thus fulfill their religious duties. In this 
sense, the demands of women with the headscarf are related to the 
expression of cultural group rights and recognition by the society and the 
state (Keyman, 2007: 226). They feel that the headscarf is an indispensable 
part of their identity and they want to cover their heads in public in order not 
to experience a clash or division of identity in their inner lives. Tolerating 
the existence of different identities within the society and state is a 
requirement of pluralism and democracy and women who wear the headscarf 
merely want to be a part of this pluralism maintaining their distinct identity 
and appearance. In their eyes, covering their heads is not the denial of their 
personality as women, nor does it destroy their identities or make them 
useless for the community and humanity. Head covering does not limit a 
woman’s actions and does not exclude her from public life, but, on the 
contrary, it justifies her presence in the public sphere and enables her to 
participate in community life actively and freely (Marshall, 2005: 111). 
Thus, like feminists and secular women, Islamist women are in favor of 
active participation of women in community life, which is dominated by 
men, whether Islamist or non-Islamist, and the improvement of the place and 
position of women in society. They represent “a rather liberated sort of 
identity which is not necessarily in line with the patriarchal relations usually 
represented within more conventional party political engagements” 
(Seçkinelgin, 2006: 763-764). Since Turkish secularist women and feminists 
are adamant supporters of the state ideology formulated predominantly by 
men, Islamist women are at least not behind their secularist and feminist 
counterparts in terms of rising up against or adopting a system formed 
outside their wills and actions. 
Women who cover their heads are aware that a secular, democratic 
and plural state guarantees the recognition of their identity rights, too. 
Therefore, they are not intent on toppling the existent system – in fact, they 
do not have the power even if they wanted to do so – and their demands do 
not represent an uprising against secularism, democracy and modern life, 
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from which they benefit. On the other hand, they are determined to resist the 
efforts to have a certain ideology like the one preferred by the Turkish 
traditional secularist elite imposed on them. They do not challenge the 
secular order, but rather challenge the imposition of a particular identity 
adopted by a certain section in the society, which actually contradicts the 
secular and democratic approach. Women who wear the headscarf are 
opposed to state control over their Islamic identity and even over their 
bodies. They do not want the others to tell them what they should wear and 
what they should not. And yet, they seem to ally themselves with male-
dominant pro-Islamic circles not only because they feel closer to them on the 
ideological grounds, but more importantly, they find themselves isolated and 
deserted within the community because of the negative attitudes of secular 
circles and especially women organizations and feminists. 
 
3. Public Perceptions of Wearing the Headscarf 
The prohibition against wearing the headscarf in universities has been the 
focus of discussions on secularism in Turkey (Plesner, 2005; Akyol, 2007; 
Kuru, 2007).
13 While the headscarf, an object worn by women, not women 
themselves, is involved in politics heavily, women are excluded from the 
public life and politics by this object (Erdem, 2007a).
14 Political parties try 
to gain the votes of the people by either defending or opposing the right of 
women to cover their head, but women wearing headscarf cannot participate 
in political life as deputies in the parliament and they cannot attend 
universities in order to get influential jobs to improve their situation. Their 
exclusion from universities and public jobs is justified by state authorities on 
the grounds that they and their attitudes constitute a serious threat to the 
survival of the regime. This means that the existence of women wearing the 
headscarf is itself a threat to the regime and their right of freedom of dress is 
tolerated at the expense of interests of the state. While state authorities 
maintain this way of thinking, the perceptions of the public on the issue 
gains importance in terms of demonstrating the difference between ordinary 
                                                            
13 Defending the freedom to wear the headscarf at universities has been the primary 
excuse to close down political parties in Turkey. Akyol accuses secular 
fundamentalism of constituting real threat to democracy, freedom and security not 
only in Turkey, but across the world. Kuru deals with affirmative evolution of a 
political party and a religious NGO. 
14 Headscarf wearing by women is very popular in Turkey. About 70% of women 
wear a headscarf. In recent years this ratio has been rising. 
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people and the elite concerning threats to the state. The rate of people who 
believe that allowing the headscarf in universities is contrary to the principle 
of secularism is 26%, while 31% of people believe that allowing the 
headscarf in the state sector conflicts with secularism. Thus, the Turkish 
people strongly support the freedom of women to wear the headscarf not 
only for university students but also female civil servants and wives of 
statesmen and bureaucrats. It can be concluded from this that the headscarf is 
seen as a subject of private life (Table 2 and 3) (Erdem, 2007a; A&G 
Research Company, 2008b).
15  
As this data demonstrates, the great majority of Turkish people does 
not see anything wrong or perceive any threat in allowing female university 
students and civil servants to cover their heads. In their minds, the headscarf 
issue does not undermine secularism, which they consider it an important 
element of the Turkish state order. If there were any doubts about this 
perception amongst the Turkish people, the election process of the Turkish 
president in 2007 removed them. When the Abdullah Gül’s candidacy for 
presidency was announced in April, his election was prevented by an 
extraordinary intervention of the military and the judiciary, who opposed it 
because Gül’s wife wore the headscarf. The general elections in July 2007, 
which were moved forward because of the deadlock in the Parliament on the 
presidency election, brought the AKP back to the power with an even greater 
majority because of the people’s sympathy toward Abdullah Gül and the 
injustice done to him. Abdullah Gül announced his candidacy for presidency 
again by stating that the people approved of their position by increasing their 
support. The people showed no negative reaction to the election of Abdullah 
Gül as president even though his wife covered her head. The referendum was 
organized to prevent the intervention of non-political powers (such as the 
military and the judiciary) in presidency election on the grounds of 
secularism and other issues concerning religion and the people ratified this 
move by believing that such issues did not undermine the nature of the state 
(Çavdar, 2007).
16 
                                                            
15 Tarhan Erdem obtained closely parallel data from a survey. While the percentage 
of people against the freedom to wear the turban at universities is only 22%, the 
percentage of people against this freedom at government services is about 19%. In 
addition, only 16.7% of people think that the turban is a symbol of anti-secularism. 
Adil Gur’s findings are also similar to these conclusions. 
16 In fact, the headscarf worn by Gul’s wife is allegedly a barrier for the president. 
Çavdar studies cases of other civil presidents. 
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In the eyes of the traditional elite, the election of someone, whose 
wife covers her head, as president would a serious development, which 
would undermine the regime and would replace the existing one with a 
theocratic regime. However, it should not be forgotten that the scope of the 
issue was more comprehensive than this. The presidency was the last 
position in the hands of the traditional elite. Losing it would bring serious 
repercussions for them. The presidency was the symbol of the Turkish 
Republic and a president of religious origins would not be good in terms of 
the secular Turkish Republic’s prestige at home or in the international arena. 
Moreover, the president had comprehensive powers in appointing officials to 
high levels of state authority and could change the character of the state by 
appointing religious people to such important positions. The traditional elite 
has experienced a real difficulty in adapting itself to such a change, which 
has led some marginal groups to initiate inclusive violent and non-violent 
actions aimed at interrupting and reversing the process. At the same time, the 
people have been persuaded that the president is sincere in complying with 
and working for the secular and democratic structure of the state. They 
believe that a first lady covering her head does not constitute any problem 
for the state. In fact, there are even some people who believe that wearing 
the headscarf in universities and state positions is contrary to secularism but 
that the headscarf of the president’s wife does not undermine secularism. In 
fact, those who perceive it as a problem constitute only one fifth of the 
Turkish society. 
Table 2. Attitudes towards the Headscarf: University Students, Civil 
Servants and Spouses of Statesmen  
 Yes  No  No  
Opinion  Total  Chi-
Square 
If university students who 
want to cover their heads are 
allowed to do so, will this be 
contrary to secularism in your 
opinion? 
26.3% 70.3%  3.4%  100.0%  2126.235 
(.000) 
If state officials who want to 
cover their heads are allowed 
to do so, will this be contrary 
to secularism in your opinion? 
31.3% 64.0%  4.7%  100.0%  1615.492 
(.000) 
Does the headscarf of 
President Abdullah Gül’s wife 
constitute a problem for you? 
20.9% 76.8%  2.3%  100.0%  2744.698 
(.000) 
Asymp. Significance levels are in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Opinions toward the Headscarf (Statesman, Bureaucrats, 
Students)  




Yes 63.0  71.8
No 30.9  22.7
No Opinion 6.1  5.6
Do you support freedom of the headscarf at 
universities?  
Total 100.0  100.0




Yes 51.7  65.0
No 40.1  29.0
No Opinion 8.2  5.9
Do you support freedom of the headscarf for  
civil servants?  
Total 100.0 
    2006-5  % 
Yes   26.1
No   68.9
No Opinion   5.0
Do you think the freedom of the headscarf for 
university students would be a problem for 
secularism? 
Total   100.0
    2006-5  % 
Yes   30.1
No   64.5
No Opinion   5.4
Do you think the freedom of the headscarf for civil 
servants would be a problem for secularism? 
Total   100.0
    2006-3  % 
Yes   22.6
No   73.3
No Opinion   4.2
Do the headscarves of some high ranking  
bureaucrats’ wives constitute a problem for you?  
Total   100.0
    2006-3  % 
Yes   24.1
No   72.9
No Opinion   3.0
Would the headscarf of a future president’s wife 
constitute a problem for you?  
Total   100.0
    2006-3 % 
Yes   22.8
No   74.4
No Opinion   2.7
Does the headscarf of the prime minister’s wife 
constitute a problem for you? 




 & Nasuh Uslu  58
a. Sociopolitical Identities 
The rate of belief that allowing university students to wear the headscarf is 
contrary to secularism is the lowest in conservative-nationalists (17%), 
higher in modernist-Kemalists (33.1%) and the highest in social democrats 
(40.4%). The same rates are seen in the belief that allowing state officials to 
wear the headscarf is contrary to secularism. And finally, the same order is 
observed among different sections of the society in being unhappy about the 
headscarf of President Abdullah Gül’s wife, but the rates for all the sections 
are lower on this issue (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Attitudes towards the Headscarf: Sociopolitical Identities  







Yes 33.1%  17.0%  40.4%  If university students who want 
to cover their heads are allowed 
to do so, will this be contrary to 









Yes 39.5%  20.7%  44.1%  If state officials who want to 
cover their heads are allowed to 
do so, will this be contrary to 









Yes 25.8%  11.3%  36.3%  Does the headscarf of President 
Abdullah Gül’s wife constitute a 









Significance levels are in parentheses.  
 
b. Socioeconomic Statuses 
The rate of belief that allowing the headscarf in both universities and public 
offices undermines secularism is higher with a high economic status. It 
seems that consciousness of and sensitivity with regard to secularism 
increases in higher parts of the social ladder. If it is evaluated from the 
perspective of enlightment, it might be asserted that people have a greater 
tendency to understand the evolution and importance of the principle of 
secularism through education and that people whose level of education and 
income is lower cannot appreciate the importance of secularism for the state 
and society. The rate of people who consider the headscarf of the President’s 
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wife as a problem, too, rises with the rise in the socio-economic level (Table 
5). 
 
Table 5. Attitudes towards the Headscarf: Socioeconomic Statuses  





SES  F test 
If university students who want to cover 
their heads are allowed to do so, will 
this be contrary to secularism in your 
opinion? 
Yes 22.3% 28.7% 34.6% 11.675 
 (.000) 
If state officials who want to cover their 
heads are allowed to do so, will this be 
contrary to secularism in your opinion? 
Yes 25.7% 34.0% 44.0% 27.388  
(.000) 
Does the headscarf of President 
Abdullah Gül’s wife constitute a 
problem for you? 
Yes 16.6% 22.1% 33.0% 20.973  
(.000) 
Significance levels are in parentheses.  
 
c. Political Party Preferences 
It is possible to divide people in terms of their political party preferences into 
two groups with regard to their approach to permitting the headscarf to be 
worn in universities and public offices. There is a great distinction between 
the followers of other parties and CHP supporters, who think in considerably 
high rates (61% and 66%) that wearing the headscarf in universities and 
public offices is contrary to secularism. The rates of people defending the 
freedom of head covering are much higher than the rate of those who do not 
defend this freedom among followers of other parties. The CHP followers 
also consider the headscarf of the president’s wife a problem at the rate of 
56% (Table 6). The CHP’s vote rate in the July 2007 elections was 
considerably lower than the number of leftist and socialist people in Turkey 
and probably includes the sections which have higher levels of income and 
education and which fear being replaced by people belonging to the 
periphery of the political, social and cultural elite. Since the votes of the 
CHP do not include the votes of people who suffer economic and social 
difficulties (traditional power sources of socialist parties), the high rate of 
CHP followers on secularism and headscarf issue comes as no surprise. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the attitude toward the headscarf is 
shaped by political party preferences rather than socio-political identities and 
is directed by the rhetoric of these parties. 
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Table 6. Attitudes towards the Headscarf: Political Party Preferences 
 AKP  CHP  MHP  DTP  Others  Undecided/ 
None.  Total F  test 











































3.9% 56.3% 22.6% 30.9% 31.7%  25.0%  20.9% 107.350 
(.000) 
Significance levels are in parentheses.  
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d. Ethnic Structure 
The approach to the headscarf issue differs greatly according to ethnic 
origins (Erdem, 2007c; Erdem, 2007b).
17 The rate of Turks who consider 
allowing the headscarf in universities and public offices contrary to 
secularism is considerably higher in comparison to the rate of Kurds (Table 
7). Similarly, Turks view the headscarf of the president’s wife as a problem 
at a considerably higher rate than Kurds. The attitudes of Kurds on the AKP 
and secularism conform to the general model, but their approach to the 
headscarf issue is very mild. Kurds generally live in rural areas and have 
been less successful in adopting modern life. Kurdish women cover their 
heads not only for religious reasons, but more often as a requirement of 
tradition. Therefore, Kurds are more inclined to accept the wearing of the 
headscarf by university students, public officials and even the president’s 
wife. Actually, they also seek recognition of their cultural rights and are 
more interested in getting their rights than the denial of the rights of others. 
 
 
Table 7. Attitudes towards the Headscarf: Ethnic Structure  
     TURK  KURD  Others  Total  F Test 
If university students who want to 
cover their heads are allowed to do 
so, will this be contrary to 
secularism in your opinion? 
Yes 27.1% 17.0% 28.8% 26.3%  3.869 
(.021) 
If state officials who want to cover 
their heads are allowed to do so, 
will this be contrary to secularism 
in your opinion? 
Yes 31.8% 21.2% 37.3% 31.3%  5.510 
(.004) 
Does the headscarf of President 
Abdullah Gül’s wife constitute a 
problem for you? 
Yes 21.7% 11.6% 22.7% 20.9%  6.439 
(.002) 
Significance levels are in parentheses.  
 
4. Conclusion 
It can be said that the headscarf is a tool in the power struggle in Turkey.  It 
is a procedural tool used in the struggle for power rather than an essential 
                                                            
17 Erdem provides detailed demographic findings on Turkey. 
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element of the conflict with the actual representatives of the 
democratic/secular regime.  In fact, that head covering should be left to 
individual choice is widely approved by the society.   Politicians who make 
the headscarf a tool of political power struggle become either winners or 
losers of the polarization the issue creates.  The headscarf is a good example 
of the fact that the manufactured conflict between the state elite and social 
leaders is symbolized through religious values.  This struggle represents that 
power struggle and the competition for economic power which are 
conducted through the ways and the means run contrary to the democratic 
idea.  It has been tried over and over again and has proven to produce 
beneficial results.  While those who demand freedom of choice with regard 
to the headscarf have come to power through legitimate means, leftist 
secular people want to come to power through illegimate ways such as 
encouraging the military to capture power through a military coup and 
calling the judiciary and the media to come to their help. 
The data on which this article is based were collected during 
fieldwork conducted in October 2007 throughout Turkey.  In addition, the 
results of other studies on the headscarf issue conducted between 2003 and 
2007 were also utilized in order to see the development over the course of 
time.  The following conclusions were reached at the end of the fieldwork:  a 
great majority of Turkish society thinks that the demands of university 
students, wives of statesmen and civil servants to wear the headscarf do not 
contradict secularism and further that an individuals’ choice to wear 
headscarf is not a problem.  Those who are offended by the freedom of the 
individual to wear the headscarf or who believe that it contradicts the tenets 
of secularism constitutes a small part of the society.  Thus, a social 
consensus on the freedom of headscarf can be said to exist in Turkey.  
The approach of people of differing socio-economic statuses (SES) 
toward the headscarf issue demonstrates a meaningful differentiation.  The 
positive attitude toward the freedom to wear the headscarf decreases as the 
SES increases.  This is an interesting finding because, contrary to traditional 
theoretical and empirical views, leftist-socialists in Turkey generally belong 
to the high SES and generally hold an anti-freedom attitude in social 
contexts.  
The attitude of socio-political groups was also observed in political 
parties having parallel tendencies.  While the supporters of conservative-
nationalist parties defend the freedom to wear the headscarf in higher rates, 
the supporters of leftist-social democrat parties have serious doubts about 
this freedom. 
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With regard to ethnicity, higher rates in defending the freedom to 
wear the headscarf were observed among people of Kurdish origin, while 
other ethnic groups and Turks supported this freedom at relatively lower 
rates.  
Consequently, it can be seen that the headscarf prohibition has no 
social basis.  As it would be a mistake to see the headscarf prohibition as an 
element of the secularism project, defining an ideology on the basis of the 
headscarf, an important religious symbol in Turkey, presents a risk to the 
progess of democracy, and only serves to increase political polarization.   
Formulating public policies on the basis of the headscarf prohibition will 
only help destroy social peace. Social engineering projects, which aim to 
change or destroy political, religious and ethnic positions of citizens, are not 
permitted in Western-type contemporary democracies.  There is no headscarf 
problem in Turkey in a sociological sense, the real problem lies in the 
totalitarian/authoritarian approach which stems from groundless fears and/or 
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